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Abstract
We consider error correction in quantum key distribu-
tion. To avoid that Alice and Bob unwittingly end up
with different keys precautions must be taken. Before
running the error correction protocol, Bob and Al-
ice normally sacrifice some bits to estimate the error
rate. To reduce the probability that they end up with
different keys to an acceptable level, we show that a
large number of bits must be sacrificed. Instead, if
Alice and Bob can make a good guess about the er-
ror rate before the error correction, they can verify
that their keys are similar after the error correction
protocol. This verification can be done by utilizing
properties of Low Density Parity Check codes used in
the error correction. We compare the methods and
show that by verification it is often possible to sac-
rifice less bits without compromising security. The
improvement is heavily dependent on the error rate
and the block length, but for a key produced by the
IdQuantique system Clavis2, the increase in the key
rate is approximately 5 percent. We also show that
for systems with large fluctuations in the error rate
a combination of the two methods is optimal.
Introduction
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) [1] is a method to
distribute a secret key between two parties, Alice and
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Bob, through a quantum channel. An eavesdropper
Eve is allowed full control over the channel. After the
communication through the quantum channel Alice
and Bob reconcile their keys using an error correction
protocol. Using a privacy amplification protocol [2,
3] any information Eve might have about the key is
removed. The unconditional security of the entire
protocol can be proven using the laws of quantum
mechanics [4, 5, 6].
For practical QKD, the secret key rate is an im-
portant factor. The main limitations on the key rate
is the transmission efficiency of the quantum chan-
nel and the performance of detectors at the receiving
end of the channel, especially detector dead time. De-
veloping better equipment is therefore important for
making QKD a viable alternative for secure commu-
nication. However it is also possible to increase the
key rate by more efficient error correction and privacy
amplification protocols.
Due to imperfect equipment and Eves possible ac-
tions during the distribution phase, errors between
Alice and Bobs keys are inevitable. Thus they need
to do error correction, ending up with identical keys.
This is done by classical communication on an au-
thenticated channel. Because this communication
reveals some information about the key, either the
communication must be encrypted using previously
established key, or additional privacy amplification
must be used. Thus it is important to have an effec-
tive error correction protocol, revealing as little in-
formation about them as possible. Assuming a block
of N bits, containing Nδ errors, the number of bits L
lost in error correction is lower bounded by the Shan-
non limit [7]. For a perfect protocol, working at the
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Shannon limit we have
L = Nh(δ) (1)
Here h(·) is the binary entropy function h(p) =
−p log p− (1− p) log(1− p).
Error correction
Error correction in QKD is generally done by ex-
change of parity information about Alice’s and/or
Bob’s keys. For processing purposes the key is di-
vided into blocks of N bits, on which error correction
is performed while the next block is distributed on the
quantum channel. Different protocols can be used for
error correction, the most popular being CASCADE
[8].
Of significant interest are also protocols using Low
Density Parity Check (LDPC) codes [9, 10]. Using
the technique of Density Evolution [11] it is possi-
ble to construct error correcting codes performing ex-
tremely close to the Shannon limit [12]. In addition
to being efficient, error correction protocols based on
LDPC has another advantageous property. Let dmin
be the minimal Hamming distance between two code-
words in the code, i.e. the minimal number of bits
flips needed to turn a codeword into another. Then
Alice and Bob’s keys differ in at least dmin bits if the
error correction protocol completes without beeing
successful. Finding dmin for a code is not solvable in
polynomial time, but one can find a lower bound. A
linear code cannot correct more errors than dmin2 . If
the code performs at the Shannon limit this gives
dmin = 2Nδ. (2)
Note that for optimal efficiency a different code is
needed for each error rate. Because creating good
codes is computationally demanding, and therefore a
time consuming task, a running QKD system would
need an large set of preestablished codes, each opti-
mized for a different error rate.
Both CASCADE and LDPC based protocols re-
quire an estimate on the error rate. This error esti-
mation is often done by random sampling. Alice and
Bob publicly announce some random bit pairs from
their keys to estimate the error rate. However, the
estimation can also be done without sacrificing bits.
For example, in both protocols the error rate of the
previous block is known to Alice and Bob, and can
be used as an estimate.
To make sure that all errors have been corrected,
Alice and Bob can verify whether their keys are iden-
tical. This verification process can be done by ex-
changing parity information [13, 14]. Given V parity
sums announced from a key with a least one error,
a very good approximation for the probability of an
undetected error is
pU|E =
(
1
2
)V
. (3)
As an alternative, we propose to exploit the mini-
mum distance of LDPC codes as follows: After error
correction Alice and Bob publicly announce V ran-
domly selected bit pairs. Since any non-identical keys
have at least dmin errors the probability of not finding
any errors given that there exist some errors is given
by
pU|E ≤
(
1− dmin
N
)V
≤ (1− 2δ)V (4)
This method is simpler and less computational de-
manding than exchanging parities, but more verifica-
tion bits are needed to reach the same pU|E .
If the actual error rate for a given block is larger
than the estimate, Bob might end up with a wrong
final key. Thus one should add a buffer ∆ to the
original estimate when running the protocol. The
chosen value for ∆ depends on the uncertainty in the
error estimate and the consequences of coding into a
wrong keyword. If the key only is used to encrypt
information going from Alice to Bob, Bob having the
wrong key only makes Alice message unreadable. On
the other hand, Bob’s key is not necessarily covered
by security proofs if it differs from Alice’s, so using
it to encrypt data would be a breach of security.
We can now find expressions for the number of bits
lost in error correction with error estimation by ran-
dom sampling (EERS), and with verification. As-
sume that block i has Nδi errors. Let  be an upper
bound for the probability that the error correction
2
step fails in a way such that Alice and Bob unwit-
tingly end up with different codewords. This bound
should be valid under any circumstances and arbi-
trary attacks by Eve. We assume that the error cor-
rection protocol used is based on LDPC codes, and
for simplicity we assume that it performs at the Shan-
non limit for any error rate.
Error estimation by random sampling
(EERS):
Random sampling of S bits gives an estimated error
rate δS , which is approximately binomial distributed
with mean δi and variance σ
2
S =
δi(1−δi)
S . The loss in
the error estimation and error correction is given by
LS = S + (N − S)h(δS + ∆S) (5)
with ∆S being the buffer parameter. Assuming that
sampling only makes a negligible change in the error
rate of the N − S remaining bits, the probability of
an undetected error is bounded by
pU = P (δS + ∆S < δi) (6)
≤ max
δi
P (δS + ∆S < δi).
The maximization over all possible values for δi is
necessary since we have no a priori information about
the error rate. Using the normal distribution as an
approximation for the binomial we get
pU ≤ max
δi
Φ
(−∆S
σS
)
(7)
=
1
2
(
1− erf(∆S
√
2S)
)
,
with Φ being the cumulative normal distribu-
tion function. A lower bound for S such that
P (δS + ∆S < δi) <  is then
S ≥ 1
2
(
erf−1(1− 2)
∆S
)2
. (8)
Verification:
Assume that Alice and Bob use the error rate of the
previous block, δi−1, plus a buffer parameter ∆V as
their estimate for the error rate. Assuming the worst
case scenario, pU |E = , the loss is given by
LV = (pE − )N + (1− pE + )(V +Nh(δi−1 + ∆V ))
(9)
with V being the number of bits used in verification
step, and pE being the probability that Bobs raw key
is transformed into the wrong codeword by the error
correction protocol.
Utilizing the minimum length between codewords
the probability of an error not being detected is given
by (4). The probability of an undetected error is
pU = pU|E pE . Since we do not know Eve’s action we
have no certain knowledge about the block error rate
δi, and therefore we cannot bound pE . Thus
pU ≤
(
1− dmin
N
)V
. (10)
Note that this is independent of the actual error rate.
Using (2) we find a lower bound for V to ensure that
pU ≤  to be
V ≥ log()
log(1− dminN )
=
log()
log(1− 2(δV + ∆V )) . (11a)
As noted we can also do the verification by parity
exchange. The number of bits used in verification is
then, using (3),
V ≥ log()
log( 12 )
. (11b)
For a system where every bit has the same a priori
probability of being an error, δi and δi−1 are both
normally distributed with mean δ and variance σ2.
In that case we have
pE = P (δi ≥ δV + ∆V ) = Φ
(−∆V√
2σ
)
, (12)
which we can use in (9) to find the total loss.
Numerical results
For performance analysis, we first consider a system
running with mean error rate δ and variance between
block error rates σ2 = δ(1−δ)N , i.e. all variance is
3
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Figure 1: Loss ratio for different error rates. N =
106,  = 10−6.
due to the inherit randomness of the bit values. The
loss in error correction is then dependent on three
parameters, the error rate δ, the security parameter
 and the block size N .
We can minimize the loss from the error correction,
(5) and (9), for different δ,  and N , with respect to
the buffer parameters ∆j , j = S, V . Note that when
running the error correction protocol, the value of the
buffer parameter is chosen according to the estimates
δS and δV , not the error rate δ. Since these estimates
are not exact, one will generally choose a suboptimal
value for ∆j , resulting in slightly larger losses than
the one showed in the following results. Also note
that the possibility of choosing a suboptimal value
for ∆j is accounted for in security analyses in the
previous section.
We define the excessive loss ratio, LEj , to be
LEj =
Lj
N
− h(δ) j = S, V (13)
Figure 1 shows that the excessive loss ratio is lower
for verification than for EERS for all error rates δ.
We also see that the difference between the two meth-
ods of verification is small compared to the difference
between error correction and verification, especially
for large δ. Since the difference is close to negligible
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Figure 2: Optimal value of the buffer parameter ∆
for different error rates. N = 106,  = 10−6.
we consider verification by utilizing minimum length
between codewords in the rest of the discussion. All
results also apply to verification by parity exchange
unless noted otherwise.
There are two main terms contributing to the dif-
ference, both related to the security parameter .
As mentioned, the probability of undetected errors,
bounded by , might be of critical importance to the
security of the protocol. If we use error estimation
we must have a high buffer parameter ∆S to avoid
such errors. However, if we use verification, we have
an efficient method to find errors after the error cor-
rection. The main purpose of ∆V is then not to avoid
all errors, but only to keep the error probability pE
low to avoid many blocks being thrown away. We
can then choose a buffer parameter ∆V < ∆S even
though our estimate δi−1 is less reliable than δS . Op-
timal values for ∆V and ∆S are shown in Figure 2.
The other reason that verification has a smaller
excessive loss than EERS is that to keep ∆S from
growing too large we must use a large sample size S.
This sample is much larger than the number of bits
V used for verification. Actually, as seen in Figure
3, V does not give a significant contribution to the
excessive loss unless we are using the minimal length
approach on a raw key with very small δ. This again
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Figure 3: Excessive loss ratio from the sampling
procedure. N = 106,  = 10−6.
shows that the method one chooses for verification,
exchange of parities or utilizing the minimum length
between codewords, is not important when it comes
to excessive loss unless δ is very small.
As shown in Figure 4 the block size N is crucial
to the excessive loss ratio. For EERS the high loss
ratio for small N is mainly due to a large part of
the block being used in the sampling process. Using
verification this loss is avoided. Here the increased
loss ratio for small N is due to the larger variance
between block error rates when N is small.
In verification, better security, i.e. decreasing the
security parameter , demands more bits V used to
check for error after the error correction. However
since V ∼ log  (11), and additionally V  Nh(δV +
∆V ), decreasing  only gives a minimal increase in
the loss ratio (9). Thus, as shown in Figure 5, we can
increase the security tremendously while sacrificing
few extra bits if we use verification. In the scheme of
EERS, as  → 0, S increases towards infinity quite
fast because of the inverse error function in (8). Since
sampling is a significant part of the loss ratio for all
but very large N , high security comes with a high
excessive loss ratio in this scheme.
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Figure 6: Excessive loss ratio for different block error
rates and block error rate variance. The block error
rates are assumed to be independent and normally
distributed. N = 106,  = 10−6.
Variable error rates
In real setups external factors like temperature fluc-
tuations and calibration routines may cause greater
variation in the block error rate. Then, using the
error rate of the last block as our estimate for the
error rate of the current block, is less reliable. To
avoid throwing away more blocks due to the less ac-
curate estimates, the buffer parameter, ∆V , must be
increased. This will lead to increased loss in the pro-
tocol. Using an EERS scheme, the loss is indepen-
dent of the block error rate variance. Thus, as shown
in Figure 6, verification is preferable when the block
error rate variance is small, while EERS should be
considered when the variance is high.
Figure 6 also indicates that the variance for which
sampling and verification has equal excessive loss
only depends slightly on δ. Thus the important vari-
ables are N and . As shown in Figure 7 large vari-
ance favors EERS while small block size and high
security demands favor verification.
In real setups the block error rate is not necessarily
normally distributed. For example, Figure 8 shows
how the block error rate evolved for a 24-hour run
of the IdQuantique system Clavis2. In this case it
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Figure 7: The curves show for which block error rate
variance and block size EERS and verification has the
same excessive loss. Verification is the best method
for parameters in the area to the left of the curves,
while EERS is best for parameters to the right of the
curves. δ = 0.05.
is difficult to model the block error rate and thus to
find an optimal ∆j . However, as can be seen from
the figure, in this run ∆V = 0.004 would be enough
to avoid any errors. Minimizing (5) with respect to
∆S for the relevant N = 2.6 · 106, δ ≈ 0.016, and  =
10−6 we find the optimal buffer parameter for EERS
to be ∆S ≈ 0.009. Thus it seems that verification
would give the smallest excessive loss for this setup.
Calculating the actual values we find LEV = 0.023 and
LES = 0.074. However, this is only true as long as it
continues its current behavior. If the variance in the
block error rate changes so does the optimal buffer
parameter and maybe also the optimal method.
In fact one of the assumption used in calculating
these results, that we always manage to choose the
buffer parameter ∆j close to its optimal value, might
not be justified for the verification scheme if the block
error rate start to fluctuate in an unexpected way.
Then there is a risk of having loss much larger then
expected. The EERS scheme is not prone to this
problem since ∆S might be estimated pretty accu-
rately from δS . Thus EERS is recommended for sys-
6
50 100 150 200 250
0.013
0.014
0.015
0.016
0.017
0.018
Block number
δ
Figure 8: Block error rate for a 24-hour run of the
IdQuantique system Clavis2
tems with unknown behavior. In this respect the
IdQuantique system the seems quite stable. Con-
sidering groups of 50 consecutive blocks, the error
rate between blocks varies a lot within each group.
However the distribution of the difference between
each block is quite similar for all the groups. Es-
pecially is the maximal difference between two con-
secutive blocks, which is the important quantity in
finding a good value for ∆V , very similar in all the
groups. Thus it seems that verification scheme with
∆V = 0.004 would work fine also for the next 250
blocks.
For the 24-hour run of the IDQuntique system 30.9
percent of the raw key was lost in error correction,
mostly due to whole blocks beeing discarded. This
gives an excessive loss ratio of 0.189. It clear that a
better error correction scheme would be beneficial to
the systems performance.
Combination of the methods
We have seen that using EERS many bits must be
sacrificed in random sampling to achieve high secu-
rity. On the other hand, when the variance in the
block error rate is high, doing verification and using
the previous block as an estimate for the error rate
also has large excessive loss since the estimate is not
Error rate Method ∆ S+VN L
E
δ = 0.05
EERS 0.0126 0.036 0.075
Combination 0.0081 0.023 0.053
δ = 0.01
EERS 0.0122 0.038 0.105
Combination 0.0077 0.025 0.076
Table 1: Results for EERS and a combination of
EERS and verification.
very accurate. Thus, if the block error rate variance
is high and we want high security combining the two
methods make sense.
The loss related to error correction using both
EERS and verification is, again assuming pU |E = ,
LC =(pE − )N + (1− pE + ) (14)
· (S + V + (N − S)h(δC + ∆C)).
Just like for EERS the loss is independent of the vari-
ance and the method is robust against wild fluctua-
tions in the block error rate.
Using the results from the EERS as our estimate
δC , the probability pE of an error after the error cor-
rection step is the same as the probability given in
(7) with ∆C for ∆S . Using verification by parity ex-
change the probability of an undetected error is then
pU = pU|E pE =
(
1
2
)V+1 (
1− erf(∆C
√
2S)
)
. (15)
For a given security parameter  the number of
bits used in error estimation is then related to the
bits used in verification by
V = log(1− erf(∆
√
2S))− log − 1 (16)
We define the excessive loss LEC as in (13) with j = C.
This can now be minimized with respect to the buffer
parameter ∆C and the sampling size S.
For  = 10−6 and N = 106 the results are shown
in Table 1. We clearly see that using a combination
of the methods leads to an improvement in perfor-
mance compared to EERS alone. We expect this im-
provement to be even more profound if we demand
higher security (decreases ), or for small block sizes,
as these are scenarios where verification significantly
outperforms EERS.
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To compare the combination method with verifica-
tion we can compare the results from Table 1 with
Figure 6. As the performance of the combination
method is independent of variance we infer that it
outperforms verification when the variance is larger
than 0.004 while verification is better for σ < 0.003.
Going back to the block error rate from the
IdQuantique system we find LEC = 0.054 for com-
bination of the methods. Thus the variance between
block error rates is so small that it seems verification
only is the best approach for this system.
Conclusion
Due to the uncertainty about the true value of the
block error rate some bits need to be sacrificed to de-
crease the probability that Alice and Bob have unde-
tected errors in their keys. This can be done by EERS
before the error correction protocol, or by verification
after the protocol. We find that verification gener-
ally outperforms EERS, however if the variance in
the block error rate is large EERS is the best choice.
To minimize the loss in error correction it is therefore
important to have a QKD system with a stable error
rate.
We propose a combination of the two methods
that generally outperforms EERS. This combination
method, and EERS, are both robust against changes
in the behavior of the error rate. If one only does
verification, large losses might occur if the block er-
ror rate changes unexpectingly. Thus the combina-
tion method should be used when the variance of the
block error rate is high or when the change in the
error rate between blocks is unknown or susceptible
to unpredictable fluctuations.
We also show that utilizing the minimum distance
of LDPC codes provides a fast and efficient way to
do verification.
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